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Mather (2019) argues that octopuses possess minds that orchestrate a suite of complex
behaviours. A central plank of her argument rests on the assumption that intrinsic exploration
and play are the products of a distinctively mental kind of intelligence. Granting that octopuses
do indeed seek out novel, informative experiences for their own sake (but see Gutfreund, 2019),
I propose an alternative view: Curiosity and play are not mere expressions of mind – they
constitute its essential foundations.
I adopt a broad, but philosophically and neurobiologically informed, interpretation of
mind as the product of an inference engine. On this view, minds are woven together from
predictions generated by probabilistic models (Clark, 2016; Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2013). Such
models are tasked with inferring the (biologically relevant) causal relations that structure the
organism’s environment – both inside (i.e., internal milieu) and out (i.e., eco-niche or Umwelt).
A common objection to this thesis is that predictive minds ought to be averse to novelty
or surprise. This follows from the idea that predictive minds seek to minimise the divergence
between the sensory states they expect to encounter and those they actually experience. The
thought goes that the easiest way to minimise this divergence (‘prediction error’) is to find a stable
environment – the more devoid of stimulation the better – and to stay there, until death (Clark,
2018; Friston et al., 2012; Schwartenbeck et al., 2013).
One way of answering this argument is to point out that organisms’ sensory environments
include their internal (physiological) states, meaning that the reclusive creature is still subject to
prediction errors generated from within (Corcoran & Hohwy, 2018; Pezzulo et al., 2015). The
octopus that sequesters itself deep inside a rocky crevice will accrue prediction error as its
metabolic resources deplete, eventually compelling it to venture out in search of food.
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This line of reasoning does not account for the inquisitive behaviour described in the
target article. Safe and sated octopuses seem intrinsically curious, motivated to explore their
environments and interact with objects in ways that disclose their properties and affordances.
Such information-seeking behaviour might seem puzzling from the perspective of minimising
prediction error: Why should an organism designed to minimise prediction error pursue novel,
surprising experiences in the absence of any obvious practical utility or extrinsic reward?
The apparent tension between information-seeking and surprise-avoiding can be resolved
by considering the role of the generative model at the heart of the predictive mind. Such models
evolved to infer the hidden (or latent) causes of the organism’s sensory states as they unfold over
time. Since most organisms inhabit complex, uncertain worlds, generative models often need to
update their parameters in order to stay attuned to fluctuating environmental conditions. Novel
experiences afford valuable opportunities to test how well model predictions ‘generalise’ to new
sensory data, and to adjust the model when significant mismatches occur. Thus, while
information-seeking behaviour might engender substantial amounts of prediction error in the
short-term, such activity is vital for adapting the model in ways that improve the quality of its
predictions (and thus minimise error) over longer timescales.
Calibrating model predictions against sensory evidence is a form of minimising prediction
error that enables the agent to learn the biologically relevant causal dependencies structuring its
environment. However, the capacity to adapt one’s model in response to sensory input is not a
distinctive property of mind per se. From a formal perspective, even a rock can be said to ‘learn’
about its environment in some minimal sense, insofar as it ‘updates’ or adapts its internal
composition in response to external forces (e.g., ocean currents). Similarly, the environment itself
can be described as a model that ‘infers’ or learns about the activities of its inhabitants over time
(Bruineberg et al., 2018; Constant et al., 2018). Yet I do not wish to claim that rocks (or niches)
harbour mental states.
These remarks suggest that minds are not characterised by the capacity to learn per se,
but rather by the capacity to steer learning in a particular direction. Minded organisms are the
architects of their own predictive models, actively sampling and interrogating their environments
to procure informative sensory data (Gottlieb & Oudeyer, 2018; cf. octopus head bobbing and
tactile exploration; Mather, 2019). That is, minded agents autonomously solicit information that
‘fills in the gaps’ within their generative models (Friston et al., 2017; Schwartenbeck et al., 2019),
thereby enhancing their epistemic grip on the world.
This analysis encourages one to view exploration and play not in terms of behavioural
outputs that are ‘controlled’ or ‘directed’ by a mind (Mather, 2019), but rather as essential
moments in the latter’s realisation. Inquisitive and ludic forms of behaviour are ultimately in the
service of discovery, revealing the causal contingencies that govern sensory experience
(Buchsbaum et al., 2012; Gopnik, 2012), and disclosing novel possibilities for future action
(Zylinski, 2015). Such intrinsically motivated ‘epistemic actions’ (Friston et al., 2015) might appear
trivial or frivolous when taken in isolation, but function as essential mechanisms in transforming
the subject of the generative model from a passive observer into an active mind.
There is a further, functional upshot of this analysis. The ability to seek out novel
information about the latent processes structuring ecological dynamics (including how one’s own
actions impact on the causal order) – and thus to revise the generative model in ways that
optimise its ‘goodness of fit’ with respect to these dynamics – should tend to engender
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predictions that enable the agent to adroitly navigate its niche over time. Equipped with a
sufficiently accurate model of hidden states and contingent relations, the organism may exploit
such knowledge to find creative solutions to novel, biologically salient problems that it encounters
in the future. The inherent curiosity and playfulness of the predictive mind thus turns out to be
functional (in an indirect, open-ended way) to the agent’s long-term viability (Bateson, 2015),
affording a ‘general-purpose fuel for success’ (Godfrey-Smith, 1996) that closes the loop between
epistemic and pragmatic action.
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